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PREFACE
This paper was prepared while the first author was a Research 
Fellow at the East-West Population Institute. He is grateful for 
the research opportunity provided by the Institute. An earlier 
version of this paper was presented at the annual meetings of 
the American Sociological Association in New York, 27—30 
August 1980. We would like to thank James T. Fawcett, 
Chan-Shik Choi, Delos Kelly, and two anonymous reviewers 
for their helpful suggestions on the earlier version. We espe­ 
cially appreciate the excellent editing of our manuscript by 
Sandra Ward, the editor of this Paper Series.
ABSTRACT Drawing on immigration statistics and secondary survey 
data, this paper attempts to delineate dominant patterns ofpost-1965 
Korean immigration to the United States, to analyze its effects on 
both societies, and in the process to evaluate the world economic sys- 
tem approach to international migration. Recent Korean immigrants 
have been characterized by high educational and occupational back- 
grounds, a high proportion of men and women in their economically 
and biologically productive ages, an overrepresentation of women and 
children, a relatively more dispersed settlement pattern upon arrival 
than other immigrant groups, and concentration in small businesses 
especially in Black ghettos and other racially mixed areas of major 
American cities.
Korean immigrants are not, in the main, part of the marginal 
population that is displaced by the modernization process but are 
likely to come from the modernized sectors of the society with strong 
mobility orientation to improve their own and their children's lots. 
The predominant occupational mobility pattern among Korean immi- 
grants is from professional or white-collar jobs in Korea to small inde- 
pendent businesses in the States. Although they do provide cheap labor for many peripheral industries in America, their more important func- 
tion for the advanced capitalism, it is argued here, is to fill the gaps 
and provide flexibility in the labor market rather than directly to pro- 
vide exploited labor for marginal industries. The role of immigrant 
labor in the advanced capitalistic economy seems to vary according to 
the stage and character of the sending economy. Korean emigration 
causes a serious brain drain problem for Korea; on the other hand. 
Korean society benefits from emigration through the reduction of 
population pressure, the receipt of substantial remittances from the 
emigrants, the return of U.S.-trained professionals, and penetration of 
the U.S. consumer market through Korean business networks. As the 
world economic system perspective would suggest, it is argued that 
Korean migration to the United States cannot be adequately under- 
stood on the individual level without looking into the ways in which 
the two societies are linked within the single world economic system. 
Whereas world system theorists are concerned primarily with the eco- 
nomic nature of center-periphery relations in the capitalist system and 
certain imperatives of the monopoly capitalism, this paper stresses the
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political and military aspects of such relationships as underlying causes 
of Korean migration to the United States.
Korean immigration to the United States has come in two waves. The 
first started in 1903 when 102 laborers arrived in Hawaii to work on 
the sugar plantations. This immigration flow was cut off in 1905 by 
the passage of successive anti-Asian immigration legislation in the 
United States and under pressure of the Japanese government in Korea to curtail further Korean emigration to Hawaii. In this first short pe­ 
riod, 7,226 Koreans are known to have arrived in Hawaii; 983 of them 
later returned to Korea. More Korean immigrants arrived after 1905, 
primarily as wives of resident immigrants, but they numbered fewer 
than 2,000.
The second wave of Korean immigration was brought about by 
changes in U.S. immigration laws m 1965. The 1965 Immigration Act 
abolished discriminatory quotas based on national origin and eased 
immigration through family relationships and skilled or professional 
job qualifications. Such changes produced a sharp increase of immi­ 
grants from Asia. The Korean proportion of Asian immigration has 
gradually risen to the point where Koreans now comprise over one- 
fifth of all immigrants from Asia. By 1975 they had become the third 
largest group entering the United States, trailing only Mexicans and 
Filipinos. The number of Korean immigrants admitted to this country 
has exceeded 30,000 every year since 1976.
Although these two migratory streams share many common ele­ 
ments, they are different from each other in both the social and eco­ 
nomic contexts in which they occurred and the social characteristics 
and the adaptation patterns of the immigrants. In this paper, we focus primarily on recent Korean immigration to the United States. Our pur­ 
pose is threefold: (1) to delineate, through the use of existing materials, the dominant patterns of Korean immigration, (2) to analyze its effects 
on both Korean and American societies, and (3) in the process to eval­ uate critically the world economic system approach to international 
migration.
DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF IMMIGRANTS
Prior to the adoption of the 1965 Immigration Act, immigration from 
Asian countries had been sharply curtailed by the Immigration Act of
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1924 and the 1952 McCarran-Walter Act. Both of these Acts continued 
the Oriental exclusion policy which had been made explicit in earlier 
regulations. The specific policy changes introduced in the 1965 Act 
are discussed in detail elsewhere (Keely, 1971; Boyd, 1974). Of partic­ 
ular relevance to our purpose is the fact that immigration from Asia 
is now largely determined by the interaction of three factors: (1) the 
limit of 20,000 visas per country per year (exclusive of visas for 
spouses, children, or parents of U.S. citizens, (2) the number of rela­ 
tives already residing in the United States as U.S. citizens or permanent 
residents, and (3) the skill levels of would-be immigrants (Boyd, 1974). 
Of course, these factors are relevant only when there are more people 
in a sending country who want to emigrate than the accepting country 
wants to admit. In the Republic of Korea, there have always been 
more than 20,000 people per year waiting for the U.S. visas.
Because of the relatively small number of Koreans in the United 
States before 1965, Korean immigrants could not use family networks 
as much as the Chinese or Japanese. Yu (1977) estimated the total 
number of Koreans in the United States in 1950 at around 17,300. 
Between 1950 (the year when the Korean War broke out) and 1960, 
6,231 Korean immigrants were reportedly admitted to the United 
States. Most of these were war orphans, students, and Korean brides 
who had married American soldiers. Between 1961 and 1964, another 
7,796 Koreans entered the United States with immigrant visas. 
Throughout that period, Korean immigrants were primarily women 
and children; the sex ratio was 29 males to 100 females. It seems clear 
that their immigration was closely related to the American troops' 
participation in the Korean War.
The volume and the pattern of Korean immigration began to change 
drastically after 1965, although the full effect of the new immigration 
policy did not begin to show until after the transition period that 
phased in major policy changes ended in 1968. The yearly volume of 
Korean immigration increased from 2,165 in 1965 to 9,314 in 1970, 
and again to 30,917 in 1977 (Table 1). The yearly total has probably 
exceeded 31,000 since 1977 owing to an increase of immigrants ex­ 
empt from the 20,000 ceiling on visas.
Consequently, the number of Koreans in America has multiplied. 
It has been estimated that the number of Koreans in the United States 
was 113,000 in 1970, 290,000 in 1976(Yu, 1977), and 400,000 as of 
March 1979 (Yu, 1979a). Assuming an annual natural increase rate of
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TABLE 1 Korean and total immigration to the United States: fiscal years 1965-77
Year
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1976 (July-September)
1977
Korean
2,165
2,492
3,956
3,811
6,045
9,314
14,297
18,876
22,930
28,028
28,362
30,803
6,887
30,917
Total
296,697
323,040
361,972
454,448
358,579
373,326
370,478
384,685
400,063
394,861
386,194
398,615
103,676
462,315
Percentage 
Korean
0.7
0.8
1.1
0.8
1.7
2.5
3.9
4.9
5.7
7.1
7.3
7.7
6.6
6.7
SOURCE: U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (1974 and 1978: table 14).
3 percent and an annual volume of 31,000 immigrants, we can esti­ 
mate the total number of Koreans in the United States at about 
460,000 as of August 1980.
One distinct characteristic of the Korean immigrants to the United 
States since World War II has been an overrepresentation of women 
and children. For every 100 females, only 48 males were admitted 
during 1970, 63 males during 1973, and 64 males during 1977. In the 
20-29 age group, the sex ratios (number of males per 100 females) 
were 23 during 1970, 32 during 1973, and 36 during 1977. Previously, 
the immigration of Korean women married to American servicemen 
contributed to the extreme sex imbalance in this age group, but cur­ rently this imbalance seems to be caused largely by the immigration of women married to Korean-Americans.
Another immigrant group showing an unusual sex-ratio imbalance is Korean children under age 5 (Table 2). The sex ratio for this group was 67 during 1973 and 64 during 1977. For immigrants from all origins 
admitted during those two years, the corresponding sex ratios were 97 
and 96 respectively. We speculate that two factors may account for this anomaly among the Korean immigrants. One factor is the traditional
TABLE 2 Age distribution and sex ratio of Korean and total immigrants admitted: fiscal years 1973 
and 1977
Age distribution (%)
Age group
0-4
5-9
10-19
20-29
30-39
40-49
50-59
60-69
70-79
80 and over
All age groups
(Number)
1973
Korean
16.6
9.2
13.6
29.4
20.3
5.8
3.1
1.9
0.4
0.1
99.9
(22,930)
Total
8.2
8.8
18.9
30.0
16.4
8.1
4.9
3.4
1.2
0.3
100.0
(400,063)
1977
Korean
17.2
10.1
15.3
28.8
15.2
6.4
3.3
2.8
0.8
0.1
100.0
(30,91 7)
Total
6.2
6.9
18.2
27.5
17.2
9.4
6.7
5.1
2.3
0.6
100.0
(462,315)
Sex ratio
1973
Korean
66.6
94.5
77.2
32.0
93.7
108.9
64.0
45.2
35.2
27.3
62.9
Total
96.6
102.0
93.0
76.9
100.7
89.3
70.0
68.0
64.8
59.1
87.2
1977
Korean
63.8
99.5
83.2
36.3
83.2
105.5
72.1
51.9
51.2
50.0
64.4
Total
95.7
104.8
98.4
82.4
96.7
88.7
72.7
63.9
67.4
63.2
88.0
SOURCE: U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (1974 and 1978: table 9).
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Korean preference for sons, which may make the parents more willing to give away their girls for adoption. Another is that American families may prefer girls to boys when adopting Korean children.
Another distinct feature of Korean immigrants is the relatively high proportion of children. Children under age 5 constituted about 17 per­ cent of the total Korean immigrants admitted during 1973, and this percentage remained the same in 1977. In contrast, the corresponding percentage for all immigrant groups was 8 during 1973 and 6 during 1977. For the U.S. population, children under age 5 constituted 7 per­ cent of the population in 1976 (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1977: 25). By comparison, children in Korea under age 5 constituted 13.2 percent of the total population in 1975 (1975 Korean Census). The relatively high birth rate of the Korean population, the age structure of the Korean immigrants, and the large number of Korean children adopted by American families all contributed to the high proportion of children among Korean immigrants. Between 1955 and 1974, Holt International Children's Service placed 16,000 Korean orphans in adop­ tive homes abroad (Korea Week, 1975:4). A great majority of these children were placed in American homes.
Like other nationalities, Koreans in the economically active and biologically reproductive ages are overrepresented among immigrants to the United States. In particular, persons between ages 20 and 39 constituted 49.4 percent of the Korean immigrants admitted during 1973 and 44.0 percent in 1977. In comparison, the corresponding percentages for all immigrant groups were 46.4 percent in 1973 and 44.7 percent in 1977. On the other hand, elderly persons are extremely underrepresentcd among the Korean immigrants. Koreans 50 or more years old constituted only 3 percent of those admitted during 1970, 7 percent during 1973, and 7 percent in 1977. For all immigrants ad­ mitted, the proportions were 14.7 percent during 1973 and 9.6 per­ cent during 1977. Whereas persons in the 50 and over age group con­ stituted 25,6 percent of the U.S. population in 1976, they made up only 12 percent of the Korean population in Korea in 1975, owing to Korea's young age structure.
California and New York are the two most favored states of destina­ tion for immigrants, including the Koreans. In 1973, 22 percent of the Korean immigrants intended to settle in California, and 11 percent intended to settle in New York. In 1977, California's share increased to 24 percent and New York's decreased to 8 percent. New York
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accepted 23 percent of all immigrants during 1973 and 19 t srcent 
during 1977. California drew 21 percent of all immigrants in 1973 and 
also in 1977. In other words, about one-third of immigrating Koreans 
settled in California and New York (with about 3 to 1 favoring Cali­ 
fornia) and about 40 percent of all immigrants settled in the two states 
(with each receiving about the same number).
Koreans tend to disperse over wider geographic areas than other im­ 
migrant groups do. The immigration statistics for 1977 indicate that 
about 65 percent of all U.S. immigrants settle in five states: 21 percent 
in California, 19 percent in New York, 12 percent in Florida, 7 per­ 
cent in New Jersey, and 5 percent in Illinois. In < untrast, the propor­ 
tion of Korean immigrants in the five largest states of destination in 
1977 was less than 50 percent (24 percent in California, 8 percent in 
New York, 7 percent in Illinois, 5 percent in Hawaii, and 4 percent in 
Texas).
Contrary to the prevailing notion, the percentages of Korean immi­ 
grants settling in major cities are relatively small when compared with 
those of other immigrant groups. Four cities, however, do seem to 
draw a substantial proportion of the Korean immigrants. In 1977, they 
attracted about 20 percent of the Korean immigrants admitted that 
year: Los Angeles, 7 percent; New York, 6 percent; Chicago, 4 percent; 
and Honolulu, 3 percent. This pattern is noticeably different from that 
of other immigrants. For the same year, New York City alone drew 17 
percent of the total immigrants. It was followed by Miami, 8 percent; 
Los Angeles, 5 percent; and Chicago, 3 percent. These four cities thus 
drew 33 percent of the total immigrants admitted.
Within cities, Korean newcomers tend to concentrate in areas of 
racial transition. For example, in Los Angeles, about 36 percent of the 
county's Koreans are concentrated in an area composed of six zip 
(postal) codes. This area was almost exclusively occupied by working- 
class whites until the mid-1960s, but has since been divided into ra­ 
cially mixed neighborhoods composed of Blacks, Chicanos, Southeast 
Asians, working-class whites, and Koreans. For incoming Korean immi­ 
grants, the area appears to serve as a launching station; most who settle 
there tend not to remain for very long. A telephone directory analysis 
indicates that about 89 percent of the Koreans living there in 1972 
had left the area by 1977 (Yu, 1979a).
The pattern of Korean immigration with respect to preference 
categories has changed noticeably over the years. During the 1966—68
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period, persons admitted under *he occupational preference categories 
(the third and the sixth preferences with their spouses and children) 
constituted 73 percent of the total Korean immigrants. But they com­ 
prised only 25 percent during 1969-72, 12 percent in 1973, and 9 
percent in 1977. About 91 percent of Koreans admitted in 1977 were 
either relatives of U.S. citizens or permanent residents; those who 
were admitted under the third, sixth, and nonpreference categories 
comprised only 4 percent (Table 3). Currently, the majority of Korean 
immigrants are close relatives of Koreans who already reside in the 
United States.
Koreans are one of the most highly educated ethnic groups in the 
United States. According to 1970 U.S. Census data, the percentages of 
persons 25 years of age and over who had completed at least four 
years of college were: Koreans, 36.3; Chinese, 25.6; Filipinos, 22.5; 
Japanese, 15.9; Whites, 11.6; and Blacks, 4.5. Subsequent surveys have 
also documented the high educational level of Koreans. The 1973 
Asian-American Field Study conducted in the Korea Town area of 
Los Angeles reported that 61 percent of the 358 sampled Koreans 25 
years of age and over had completed at least four years of college (U.S. 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 1974). A 1978 tele­ 
phone survey in Los Angeles indicated that 71.1 percent of the Korean 
household heads and 64.7 percent of their spouses had completed at 
least four years of college (Yu, 1979b). This same survey also revealed 
that 10 percent of the Korean household heads and 3 percent of their 
spouses held an M.A., M.S., or a Ph.D. degree. A 1978 survey of 116 
Korean blue-collar workers in Chicago indicated that 40 percent of the 
female and 58 percent of the male respondents had completed their 
college education prior to immigration to the United States (Hurh and 
Kirn, 1979). A nationwide mail survey of Koreans in the United States 
conducted in the summer of 1979 found that 66.5 percent of the re­ 
spondents had received a college education (Joong-Ang Daily News, 
1979).
The majority of recent Korean immigrants came from backgrounds 
of relatively high occupational status. Among those who came in 1970 
and who reported their previous occupations before immigration, 68 
percent had held professional and technical jobs in the Republic of 
Korea. The overall occupational level of the Korean immigrants has 
declined noticeably in more recent years; professional and technical 
workers comprised 50 percent of the Korean workers admitted in
TABLE 3 Korean and total immigrants admitted, by preference category: fiscal years 1973 and 1977
Preference category
Occupational preference 
Third (persons in professions)
Sixth (other workers in 
needed occupations) 
Their spouses and children
Seventh (certain refugees)
Nonpreference (private bill, 
investment, and other cases)
Relative preferences
1 mmigrants exempt from 
numerical limitations (spouses 
and children of U.S. citizens)
All categories
1973
Korean
2,683 
654
440 
1,589
0
4,708
8,312
7,014
22,717
(%)
(11.8) 
(2.9)
(2.0) 
(7.0)
(0.0)
(20.7)
(36.6)
(30.9)
(100.0)
Total
26,767 
8,521
4,549 
13,697
9,808
34,479
92,054
117,152
280,260a
(%)
(9.6) 
(3.0)
(1.6) 
(4.9)
(3.5)
(12.3)
(32.8)
(41.8)
(100.0)
1977
Korean
2,613 
1,054
152 
1,407
1
33
17,218
10,570
30,435
(%)
(8-6) 
(3-5)
(0.5) 
(4.6)
(0.0)
(0.1)
(56.6)
(34.7)
(100.0)
Total
23,585 
6,554
4,673 
12,358
9,575
112,556
130,784
185,815
462,315
(%)
(5.1) 
(1.4)
(1.0)
(2-7)
(2.1)
(24.3)
(28.3)
(40.2)
(100.0)
a Not including immigrants from the Western Hemisphere.
SOURCE: See tables 2, 6, and 7 of U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (1974 and 1978).
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1973, 40 percent in 1976, and 35 percent in 1977. But still a substan­ tially higher proportion of Korean immigrants have backgrounds of 1-igh occupational statu: than do other immigrants (Table 4). Although the proportion vf Korean workers in the professional category has de­ clined, the share in clerical and operative categories has increased sub­ stantially. Among the Korean workers admitted in 1973, clerical work­ ers constituted 6 percent and operatives 4 percent. These percentages increased to 12 and 16 respectively in 1977. This downward trend in occupational ranking is expected to continue, as the relatives of the Koreans already in the United States remain the predominant source of immigration.
TABLE 4 Percentage distribution of Korean and total immigrants
admitted to the United States, by occupation: fiscal years 1973 and 1977
Occupation
Professional, technical, and
kindred
Managers and administrators
Sales
Clerical
Crafts
Operatives
Laborers
Farmers
Farm laborers
Service
Private household service
All occupations reported
(Number)
1973
Korean
49.5
15.1
1.1
6.1
12.9
4.3
1.0
0.0
1.4
6.4
2.1
99.9
(5,879)
Total
26.3
5.9
1.7
8.4
12.2
13.6
11.7
0.1
4.0
10.5
5.6
100.0
(156,477)
1977
Korean
35.2
14.4
3.1
12.1
11.7
12.6
1.5
0.2
2.6
6.0
0.6
100.0
(7,881)
Total
23.8
9.2
3.0
10.7
11.3
18.3
6.5
0.3
3.6
8.9
4.5
100.0
(189,378)
SOURCE: U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (1974 and 1978: table 8).
MOTIVES FOR IMMIGRATION AND ECONOMIC ADAPTATION
A basic question in any migration study is why people choose to up­ root themselves from a familiar place and move to a strange and often unwelcome place. Data addressing this question regarding Koreans are scanty and unsystematic. Furthermore, even the available data are con­ cerned mainly with only the expressed reasons for emigration or
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immigration. When we examine the reasons for migration, however, 
it is necessary initially to distinguish between the surface reasons that 
are perceived and articulated by the individuals, and the structural 
reasons that are at the root of the surface reasons; the latter are not 
necessarily perceived by the individuals. Later in this paper we will 
address this latter concern. For the present, we will examine data 
dealing with the dominant motives offered by Korean emigrants.
One structured survey conducted in the Republic of Korea in 1978 
with 510 prospective emigrants who were in the process of emigration 
at the time revealed that three reasons for emigration were most fre­ 
quently mentioned: (1) economic reasons, (2) educational oppor­ 
tunities for children, and (3) family union (Hong and Kim, 1979). 
The three reasons were mentioned with more or less equal frequencies. 
Another study conducted in the United States with 152 Korean busi­ 
nessmen in the Los Angeles area (Bonacich and Light, 1981) con­ 
firmed that economic reasons (e.g., "for a better life") were by far the 
most frequently mentioned (by about 42 percent), whereas the next 
in frequency of mention was a concern for children's education (20 
percent), political reasons-lack of human rights, fear of another war, 
etc.—(13 percent), and family reunion (12 percent). A study in Chi­ 
cago also stressed educational reasons as well as economic reasons 
(Kim and Condon, 1975). Judging from these data and our own per­ 
sonal observations, it seems clear that Korean immigration to the 
United States is predominantly a social mobility-oriented movement.
How successful have Koreans been in achieving their goal in the 
"land of opportunities"? This is a difficult question to answer, pri­ 
marily because social mobility is not simply a matter of moving up or 
down a single occupational hierarchy. Before attempting to answer the 
question, it is essential to examine the occupational activities of Ko­ 
rean immigrants. Two patterns stand out. One is that Korean immi­ 
grants work very hard; the other is that many work in small businesses.
That Korean immigrants work hard is evidenced by their high labor 
force participation rate and the large number of hours they work per 
day. Yu's 1978 telephone survey of 180 Koreans in Los Angeles re­ 
vealed that 98 percent of the Korean household heads and 63 percent 
of their spouses were employed full-time (Yu, 1979b). This survey 
also indicated that almost a half of the respondents worked more than 
nine hours a day, about 20 percent worked more than 10 hours, and 
about 25 percent worked during the evening and night hours. Nearly 
half of them worked on the weekends.
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The same survey disclosed that 40 percent of household heads and 36 percent of their spouses in Los Angeles were proprietors of some type of small business. Using a different method (counting the num­ ber of Korean-owned enterprises in Los Angeles County and dividing it by the number of Korean households), Bonacich et al. (1980) esti­ mated that about one quarter of all Korean households in the Los Angeles area were in business for themselves. Why do so many Koreans move into small business, especially when the economy appears to be moving in the opposite direction? Bonacich et al. offer three major "immediate reasons": (1) the lack of alternative occupational choices; (2) the desire to obtain high income levels (it guarantees work oppor­ tunities for all able members of the family and enables them to work overtime in the evenings and on weekends); and (3) that investment in a small business was used by many Koreans as a means to obtain per­ manent resident visas. By and large, many Korea^ immigrants view small entrepreneurship as a major avenue of social mobility, especially when upward mobility is blocked in the organized sector. It is note­ worthy, as Bonacich et al. (1980:179) observed, that Koreans "have bought the 'American dream' while, paradoxically, most Americans have given up on it."
The specific types of small business that Koreans enter tend to be of the trade and services varieties. They are most likely to be hamburger shops, corner grocery or fruit and vegetable stores, wig shops, liquor stores, gas stations, shoe repair shops, and the like. Recently some Ko­ rean garment factories have emerged, but the majority of Korean busi­ nesses are still small. A 1972 Census Bureau study of business activities in the United States found that of the 1,201 Korean businesses re­ corded (obviously an undercount), only 21 percent had any paid em­ ployees, 61 percent had one to four employees, and about 19 percent had more than five workers. It is evident that Korean businesses are characterized by labor-intensive activities with low capital investment.Another important feature of Korean businesses is that they tend to be located in the downtown or business districts, particularly in the Black ghettos, Spanish-speaking barrios, and racially mixed zones of the city. In this sense, Koreans seem to perform the role of "middle­ man minority," filling the gaps left by monopoly capital (Bonacich et al., 1980). This last point suggests some larger structural reasons as to why there are so many Korean (and other Asian minority) small busi­ nesses in the United States.
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As Bonacich et al. have observed, "Entrepreneurship is not some­ 
thing they [Korean immigrants] fall into 'naturally' or out of habit, 
but must be acquired on arrival" (1980:174). They argue that two 
aspects of monopoly capitalism are responsible for pushing Koreans 
into small business. One is that large corporations, given their empha­ 
sis on efficiency and profitability, leave gaps in the economy. For 
example, the ghettos and barrios, with their attendant high crime rates 
and credit problems, may be deserted by the corporations for more 
profitable locations, thus leaving the poorer areas to those immigrants 
who are willing to accept the reduced profit margins and higher crime 
risk. Another factor is that the immigrants themselves create small 
business niches that monopoly capital finds exploitable. This situation 
seems to apply to the garment industry subcontracting and mainte­ 
nance companies-situations in which Korean entrepreneurs often help 
the corporations to exploit cheap immigrant labor.
At this point, we can broaden our focus a bit by examining the en­ 
tire occupational distribution exhibited by Korean immigrants. The 
data from Yu's 1978 Los Angeles sample survey (1979b), presented 
in Table 5, indicate that for household heads the largest category next 
to proprietors (who constituted 40 percent) was professionals (25 per­ 
cent). Manual workers (both skilled and unskilled) comprised about 
25 percent of the household heads. This occupational distribution 
represents remarkable downward mobility compared with the
TABLE 5 Percentage distribution of Korean household heads and 
their spouses, by occupation: Los Angeles and Orange 
Counties, 1978
Occupation
Professional
Proprietor
Clerical
Skilled worker
Unskilled labor
Sewing
Other
All occupations
Heads
Number
38
61
15
19
20
0
20
153
Percentage
24.8
39.9
9.8
12.4
13.1
0.0
13.1
100.0
Spouses
Number
12
33
13
5
33
21
13
97
Percentage
12.4
34.0
13.4
5.2
34.0
21.6
13.4
100.0
SOURCE: Yu(1979b).
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distribution of the immigrants' occupations held in Korea. Of those who had held jobs there, approximately 58 percent had worked in pro­ fessional occupations, whereas only 8 percent had been employed in manual occupations.
Examining the immigrants' occupational mobility pattern more closely, we see that the predominant pattern involves professional men who become small businessmen. According to Yu's 1978 Los Angeles study, about or.^-ihird of Korean men who experienced occupational mobility conformed to this pattern. The mobility pattern among Ko­ rean women, however, was noticeably different. In Los Angeles, the largest category of women comprised those employed in semi- or unskilled jobs, primarily as sewing workers in small garment factories. Another large category was in small business (34 percent). By con­ trast, over three-quarters of the immigrant women who had held jobs in Korea were either professional or clerical workers and none of mem was an unskilled manual laborer. More than half of those women doing sewing work in Los Angeles had not held jobs in Korea (Yu, 1979b).The general situation for Korean immigrant women in the United States is that they now have to work and thus contribute to the family income, and the most likely options open to them appear to be jobs in the local garment sweat shops or helping their husbands to operate small shops. It is perhaps remarkable that more than half of Korean working women work on weekends, and more than three-quarters of them do so while looking after their dependent children.The occupational patterns described above, however, refer mainly to recent immigrants, as more than half of the 1978 Los Angeles sam­ ple had resided for less than four years in the United States. There are indications that after a short period of downward mobility, many Ko­ rean immigrants move up the occupational ladder by starting a busi­ ness of their own. Some may obtain a professional license or creden­ tial. Among the Koreans who became naturalized U.S. citizens, 36 per­ cent of those who worked svere professional and managerial workers in 1970; the corresponding figure in 1977 was 54 percent (see Table 6).
Job satisfaction may be another important indicator of economic adjustment. The 1978 Los Angeles study showed that workers' satis­ faction with their work is closely related to their educational levels, occupational standing, and the length of stay in the United States. As can be expected, job dissatisfaction is strong among those who have
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TABLE 6 Percentage distribution of Korean and total employed persons naturalized as U.S. citizens, by occupation: fiscal years 1973 and 197?
15
Occupation
Professional, technical, and 
kindred
Managers and administrators 
Sales
Clerical
Crafts
Operatives 
Laborers
Farmers
Farm laborers
Service
Private household workers
All occupations reported
(Number)
1973
Korean
42.2
6.8 
2.1
10.4
3.0
11.3 
2.4
0.0
0.0
20.9
0.8
100.0
(1,190)
Total
22.6
7.2 
4.2
14.4
12.1
15.1 
5.4
0.1
0.4
17.2
1.2
100.0
(76,246)
1977
Korean
42.5
11.8 
2.3
7.0
13.1
9.9 
2.2
0.1
0.2
10.7
0.3
100.0
(4,862)
Total
26.3
8.6 
3.7
14.4
14.1
14.6 
4,5
0.1
0.4
12.5
0.8
100.0
(101,462)
SOURCE: U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (1974 and 1978: table 40).
recently arrived and are still in the process of adjusting. The degree of job satisfaction appears to improve as individuals move into the pro­ fession they have prepared for, or as they begin a business of their own.
THE WORLD ECONOMIC SYSTEM APPROACH
It may be true that all voluntary migration represents the desire of an individual to obtain a better life. But migration is not simply an indi­ vidual matter. Behind each individually determined movement there always exist some deeper structural conditions that influence the size ? id the pattern of the whole migratory stream; these, in turn, exert a definite influence on both the sending and the receiving societies. Most studies of migration have been concerned with individuals' motivations and their adaptations and have thus neglected to give ade­ quate attention to these broader, structural questions. This neglect appears to be due largely to the earlier theoretical orientation, which viewed migration primarily as an individualistically-motivated phe­ nomenon that arises when there is need to restore equilibrium between
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spatial units. According to that view, the resultant migration decreases 
the population pressure in low-growth areas and provides for the labor 
needs of the growing regions, thus helping to restore balance between 
human and capital resources. But recently there has emerged a new 
theoretical approach, the world economic system perspective, which 
draws attention to the broader structural factors that influence inter­ 
national migration. In this section we first briefly review the major 
theses of this new approach and subsequently examine several issues 
related to Korean immigration to the United States that are suggested 
by the approach.
The world economic system perspective proposes a clean break with 
the equilibrium theory of migration. The basic assumption of the per­ 
spective is that contemporary international labor migration is caused 
by the imperatives of capitalism, which is organized on a global scale 
for worldwide capital accumulation. It is important, therefore, not to 
put too much weight on individual motivations to migrate, or even on 
the "push" or "pull" factors operating in the country of origin or 
country of destination. Instead, primary attention must be given to 
the logic and the rhythms of the current phase of monopoly capitalism. 
It is generally recognized that contemporary international migration is 
basically labor migration, with its dominant direction from peripheral 
to core industrialized countries.
Theorists who subscribe to some version of this theoretical frame­ 
work believe that to gain a full understanding of the causes and nature 
of international labor migration, one must place this movement in the 
context of the world economic system. They offer two lines of ex­ 
planation.
The first explanation emphasizes the so-called "development of 
underdevelopment" process, which is caused in peripheral countries 
by the penetration of the core, metropolitan capital (Frank, 1967). 
The resultant processes of surplus extraction, "uneven development" 
between regions and sectors, "structural dislocations" or "displace­ 
ment" of surplus labor, and increasing inequality of income and under­ 
employment problems are all believed to be the major factors leading 
to emigration. In this regard, internal and international migration are 
intimately related processes and perhaps may not need to be distin­ 
guished, as they are influenced by the same externally induced uneven 
development (Fortes, 1978). Noting that emigration/immigration is 
simply a product of the uneven development inherent in the capitalist
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mode of production, Castells (1975:35) points out, as major reasons 
of permanent emigration, such factors as "decomposition of backward 
productive structures-especially in agriculture; structural unemploy­ 
ment in certain sectors; and the much higher nominal and real wages 
available in the advanced capitalist countries." Similarly, Fortes (1978: 
11) argues:
Sustained labor migration requires the penetration of the political and economic institutions of the dominant society into the subordinate one. This penetration creates imbalances between sectors and institutions of the subordinate society that lead eventually to labor displacement. Imbalances are first induced from the outside but in time become internal to the structure of the weaker societies. These internal imbalances, not invidious comparisons with the wealth of more developed regions, are what underlie sustained processes of labor migration.
Whereas the first explanation for placing migration within the context 
of the world economic system is concerned with structural causes of 
emigration from peripheral countries, the second focuses on the eco­ 
nomic processes in the receiving countries having advanced capitalist 
economies. The world economic system theorists argue that the main 
reason why such countries accept immigrant labor is their need for 
capital to counter the basic tendency for the rate of profit to fall. 
Bonacich (1981:63) makes this point most succinctly:
... labor immigration grows out of the logic of capitalist development, which creates a tendency for the profit rate to fall and a cyclical tendency toward crises, and an effort to solve these problems by seeking to increase the rate of exploitation by absorbing new, and cheaper, sources of labor-power.
Immigrant labor alleviates the crises of the current phase of monop­ 
oly capitalism in several ways. First, immigrant workers, willing to 
work for lower pay at longer hours and under worse conditions than 
native workers, provide a competitive element in the labor market 
that prevents the indigenous workers from continuing to accelerate 
their pay and benefit demands. Second, migrant workers-most of 
whom are of prime working ages, have few dependents, and have been 
nourished and educated in their home countries-help capitalists 
achieve tremendous reductions of the "social cost" of production. 
Magnifying this cost reduction is the selective nature of migration, for 
migrants are typically the better educated and more vigorous segment 
of the sending society (Petras, 1980). Third, immigrant labor plays an 
important role as a regulator of capitalist crises. Castells (1975:55) 
argues that "immigrant workers are one of the basic elements
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preventing recessions from turning into crises." In a sense, then, immi­ 
grant workers fulfill the role of the "ideal worker-consumer": They 
are very productive in the expansionary phase of a capitalist economy; 
they are excludable in the recessionary phase; and they consume little 
(Castells, 1975). Similarly, Petras (1980:444) observes that immigrant 
workers "play a unique role in helping maintain an equilibrium for 
capital during periods of economic fluctuation."
Several other propositions are suggested by the world economic 
system perspective, but for the present purpose it may be sufficient to 
keep these basic points in mind and turn to the case at hand. Here we 
are concerned mainly with three aspects of Korean migration to the 
United States: (1) the processes in the Republic of Korea that lead to 
emigration, (2) the effects of emigration on Korean society and econ­ 
omy, and (3) the role of Korean immigrants in the American economy. 
At the outset, it is important to emphasize that Korean migration to 
the United States is characterized by labor migration, as evidenced by 
the predominance of working-age immigrants who are economically 
motivated and who seek jobs as soon as they arrive in the United 
States. Therefore, the world economic system perspective should be 
applicable to the Korean-U.S. migration process.
Structural causes of Korean emigration
In considering structural causes of emigration from peripheral to core 
countries, we have seen that the world economic system perspective 
stresses the economic effects of the penetration of the metropolitan 
capital into the peripheral economy. Actually, there is a great deal of 
fuzziness in many of the world economic system arguments relating to 
this point; but the main line of reasoning is thai; this external penetra­ 
tion leads to uneven development between sectors and regions, and the 
uneven development, in turn, leads to growing economic inequality 
and structural unemployment and underemployment. According to 
the theory, these processes would in time facilitate the displacement 
of a large labor force and the displaced labor would constitute the 
source of cheap labor to be exported. These arguments are thus quite 
consistent with Frank's (1967) thesis of "development of underde- 
velopment," which he views as an almost inevitable consequence of 
external economic dependence.
The Korean case, however, raises many difficulties for such an argu­ 
ment. Prior to 1979, the Korean economy, although highly dependent
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upon the two metropolitan economies of the United States and Japan, achieved remarkable economic growth. There certainly were problems of sectoral and regional disparity in growth rates, but the level of un­ employment or underemployment was noticeably reduced, and along with this progress absolute poverty was almost eliminated. Neverthe­ less, we do not believe that Korea's economic progress has reduced the number of actual or potential emigrants. Furthermore, those who emigrated were, by and large, not the persons who were structurally replaced or the victims of growing economic inequality. On the con­ trary, they were people who had tended to benefit from the depen­ dent nature of the country's economic growth.
Yet, we do not believe that the Korean experience necessarily dis­ proves the validity of the world economic system perspective, except perhaps its overly economic interpretations. We must realize that the effect of foreign economic penetration into peripheral societies is not restricted to the economic realm but extends to political, social, and cultural institutions. The process occurring within the wide nexus of social institutions and cultural life may be labeled as "structural im- balancing" or "peripheralization." Among the world economic system theorists of migration, Fortes (1978) has shown a particular sensitivity to this process. Specifically, he cites two forms of "externally induced structural imbalances" in peripheral societies. One is the articulation of peripheral institutions with those of the center. The emigration of professional workers illustrates this process.
Professional emigration is basically a consequence of the reproduction of the technical training apparatus of advanced nations in underdeveloped ones. Im­ planted institutions come to function more in accordance with needs and re­ quirements of the advanc^ d societies than those of the country that receives them (Fortes, 1978:18).
In fact, it is not just professional training programs but also the whole educational system and many other institutional practices in the Re­ public of Korea that have been more or less implanted by American influence since 1945. Given such structural imbalances, the more closely Korea follows the American model of development, the more people there will be whose skills and aspirations cannot be absorbed in Korean society.
The other related form of imbalance or perif'oralization touches on the cultural realm. It is widely accepted that peripheral societies have absorbed an increasingly modern culture and the cult of advanced
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consumption, while denying the mass of their populations the means 
to participate in it. Fortes (1979:433) observes that "the mass media 
have made sure that the attractions of modern consumerism reach the 
most remote corners of the country" but that underdevelopment and 
a highly unequal distribution deny access to these goods to the ma­ 
jority of the population. This situation, as he suggests, may be labeled 
as the syndrome of "modernity-in-underdevelopment." Migration to 
the center country where this "modernity" originated is, therefore, 
one way for individuals to resolve this contradiction.
Attention to structural imbalance in the society and culture of a 
peripheral country greatly improves our understanding of emigration. 
But still there is a crucial dimension of imbalance that is missing; it is 
the political situation that is created by dependence on a powerful 
foreign country. And this is particularly h.;j> jrtant for countries like 
Korea. As Skocpol argues in her critique of Wallerstein (1974), the 
current theorizing within the world economic system approach tends 
to make a two-step reduction: "first, a reduction of socio-economic 
structure to determination by world market opportunities and techno­ 
logical production possibilities; and second, a reduction of state struc­ 
tures and policies to determination by dominant class interests" (1977: 
1079). The world economic system theorists tend to undervaluate the 
significance of incessant politico-military competitions among nations 
and the specific geopolitical situation of each country as independent 
factors influencing countries' economic and social development pat­ 
terns. The Republic of Korea experienced a tragic war 30 years ago 
and is still under the constant threat of another war. How much of the 
internal political, social, and even intellectual processes are determined 
by this experience, and how much of hidden but persistent psycho­ 
logical insecurity is created by it, are difficult to appreciate by those 
outside the system. Yet, the Korean hostilities were initially created by 
the major forces in the world system, even though the world system 
we speak of here is not just the capitalistic economic system but also 
the politico-military system in which big powers compete with one an­ 
other for political hegemony. In the absence of relevant data, we sus­ 
pect that the political insecurity created in the Republic of Korea by 
such external forces may be one of the most important underlying rea­ 
sons for Korean emigration. Certainly, political factors have loomed as 
the most important causes of immigration to the United States from 
Vietnam and Cuba in recent years, and they will probably play the
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most important role in accelerating immigration from many politi­ 
cally troubled Asian countries in the near future. It would appear, 
then, that the structural pressures for emigration in the Republic of 
Korea do not reside only in economic conditions but include and may 
even be dominated hy political instability and structural imbalances 
that are the result of that country's integration into the world system.
Implications of Korean emigration for Korea
As far as we know, the Korean government has not established any 
well-planned official policy on emigration, but it has been concerned 
mainly with three things: reduction of population pressure, obstruc­ 
tion of any large-scale capital flight, and prevention of any negative 
effects on social and political stability. Unfortunately, data that might 
be used to assess the success of this strategy are scarce and those that 
are available pertain mainly to demographic aspects. One recent study 
sponsored by the Korea Development Institute in Seoul (Hong and 
Kim, 1979) estimated the total number of Korean emigrants between 
1962 and 1977 to be 317,746, of whom 76 percent went to the 
United States. This number constitutes slightly less than 1 percent of 
the total population of the Republic of Korea. But the long-term 
demographic effects of emigration should be greater than these data 
indicate, because a high proportion of the emigrant group consisted of 
women of reproductive age.
When people leave their places of origin, they do not simply reduce 
the number of human bodies to be fed. They also take other things 
with them. On the part of the less developed countries, a serious prob­ 
lem associated with emigration is the loss of human capital, the so- 
called "brain drain." Indeed, the brain drain problem is quite serious 
in Korea. We have already noted that the current U.S. immigration 
policy favors immigration of skilled workers and professionals and that 
the largest category of Korean immigrants are those who have received 
professional training in Korea. The proportion of the college-educated 
among the emigrants is about eight times higher than its counterpart 
among the total Korean population. According to Hong and Kim's 
estimate, the Republic of Korea has lost abos-t 2.6 million years of 
schooling by virtue of the emigration that took place between 1962 
and 1977. They further estimate that the total government expendi­ 
ture for the schooling of those who left the country during the 1962- 
77 period was around 220 billion won at their 1976 value (about
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458 million 1976 U.S. dollars); to this figure we must add the educa­ tional cost to their parents, which totaled about 146 billion won 
(about $304 million) in the same period. The total figure is equivalent to about 2.6 percent of the gross national product in 1977, undoubt­ edly a tremendous loss for a developing country. There is a growing awareness among researchers of international migration that labor mi­ gration from the less developed to the more developed countries is 
often accompanied by what is sometimes called "reverse foreign aid" given by poor countries to the rich. Newland (1979) estimated that 
the value of skilled emigrants to the United States, the United King­ 
dom, and Canada alone was around $46 billion during the period from 1961 to 1972. Presumably, Korea's contribution to this interesting form of development subsidy has been substantial.
So far, the Korean government has not been as sensitive to the brain drain as it has been to the "capital flight" problem. Korean emigration law specifies that emigrants may only take the equivalent of $2,000 
per adult and SI ,000 per child with them. Legally, there are no other ways to transfer one's property to the country of destination beyond this allowed amount. The Korean government has also restricted emi­ gration of top-level businessmen and high-ranking government officials. There is, however, a widespread belief among Koreans in both the United States and Korea that many Koreans bring a large amount of money to the United States. That capital flight becomes a sensitive 
issue whenever there is political turmoil in Korea suggests the serious­ ness of this problem.
The flow of skills and capital is certainly not unidirectional. There is no doubt that recent economic development in the Republic of Ko­ rea owes a great deal to educated Americans. We find Koreans with American Ph.D.s in many Korean educational and research institutions, and they are particularly visible among technocrats who have engi­ neered Korean economic development in the past two decades. Be­ 
cause it is plausible that a large proportion of them received some kind of financial assistance from the U.S. government while they were 
studying in the United States, the assistance can be regarded as U.S. 
investment in Korean human capital which moved back to Korea. It must be noted, however, that only a small proportion of U.S.-educated Koreans have returned to Korea and, once back in Korea, they have 
generally contributed to the maintenance of close relations between 
the two countries. In several ways, then, this kind of U.S. training of
The World Economic System Approach 23
Korean workers furthers the structural imbalances we commented on earlier. But it is impossible to calculate any exact net balance in this two-way flow of human capital between the two countries.Even if Koreans have to smuggle their money out of Korea, they can send money freely to Korea. According to Korean official statis­ tics reported in Hong and Kirn (1979), the amount of remittances from Koreans abroad totaled $1,124 million between 1970 and 1978, of which $757 million originated from the United States. In 1977 re­ mittances from Korean emigrants constituted about 0.4 percent of Korea's GNP. The actual amount of money sent to Korea is probably greater, because this figure does not include the flow (both in cash and goods) that occurs outside the formal banking institutions.In addition to these tangible capital gains through remittances, the Korean economy has bene fitted from Korean businesses in the United States that merchandize such Korean products as wigs, clothes, and plastic items. There has always been a close connection between Ko­ rean manufacturing activities at home and the immigrants' businesses in the United States. Development of synthetic hairs and the booming garment industry in Korea have assisted Korean immigrants' economic adaptation tremendously, while Korea in turn has benefited much in penetrating the U.S. consider market.
The role of Korean immigrants in the U.S. economy
As we saw earlier, the world economic system perspective suggests that the main reason why metropolitan capital is willing to accept the immigrant labor is that such labor is cheaper than indigenous labor and not "corrupted" by the national labor movement. World eco­ nomic system theorists argue, moreover, that the state colludes with capitalists in keeping the immigrant worker's politico-legal status vulnerable and thus economically exploitable. In addition, most econ­ omists agree that "monopoly and competitive sector firms are in a somewhat different position in regards to both their immediate need for cheap labor-power and their ability to make use of it" (Bonacich, 1981:47). Generally, competitive-sector firms score higher on both (see also Castells, 1975;Petras, 1980).
The extent to which Korean immigrant workers perform cheap labor in the United States is less clear than is the case of the Mexican illegal migrant workers in the United States or the guest workers in Great Britain and Germany. On the one hand, there is much evidence
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that Korean immigrants tend to undersell their skills. The college- 
educated immigrants in semi-skilled manual jobs and exprofessional 
workers who work as small-scale proprietors, as well as highly edu­ 
cated women in low-paying garment industry jobs, indicate the exis­ 
tence of cheap-labor problems. Other employed Korean workers are 
by and large concentrated in what is called the "secondary labor mar­ 
ket," a market where jobs are fairly unstable and unprotected by 
unions and where there is no well-defined career mobility ladder. Fur­ 
thermore, within this general secondary labor market, Korean workers 
tend to be concentrated in the less desired geographic areas. We noted 
above that most Korean shops are located in the relatively poor and 
crime-ridden sections of U.S. cities. Even many Korean physicians and 
other professional workers tend to work in less popular areas offering 
fewer rewards. On the other hand, it is difficult to see an association 
between the dominant economic activities of Korean immigrants and 
exploitative relationships with capital, large or small. In fact, one of 
the most interesting features of Korean economic adaptation in the 
United States is Koreans' avoidance of exploitative labor relations 
through their ownership of small, independent businesses.
The extent and mechanisms by which ethnic small businesses serve 
the interests of large capital are not entirely clear. Of course, there are 
some business activities like contracted garment production or main­ 
tenance services where the immigrant small entrepreneurs ("the middle­ 
men minority," in Bonacich's terms) serve the interests of monopoly 
capital by organizing and controlling their own ethnic labor force. But 
that is not the case with corner grocery stores, restaurants, clothing 
stores, and the like where the majority of Korean small businessmen 
are found. Nor does monopoly capital appear to profit from many 
professionals who work in less desirable locations.
It seems useful to expand our attention from the narrow interests 
of capital to the broad interests of professional organizations and con­ 
sumers whom Korean immigrant workers may serve. It can be argued, 
for example, that the large number of Korean and other Asian physi­ 
cians in the United States has served the interests of the American 
Medical Association (AMA). Rather than establishing more medical 
schools in the United States, the AMA seems to have preferred bring­ 
ing in foreign M.D.s, in order to maintain flexibility in its professional 
labor market, because the flow of foreign trained M.D.s can be cut off 
at any time. Furthermore, foreign physicians perform an important
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social function by providing their services to people who live in small 
towns or in the poor sections of large cities—i.e., to the consumers 
who are by and large deserted by the native professionals. The latter 
function is quite similar to the role of Korean small businessmen who 
serve the racial minority customers in the downtown areas of many 
U.S. cities. Therefore, we are inclined to view Korean immigrants' 
contribution to monopoly capitalism as an indirect one—through 
filling the gaps left by monopoly capital and providing flexibility to 
some professional labor markets rather than directly providing an ex­ 
ploited labor force. The latter function is performed more frequently 
by immigrants from other less developed countries.
In many ways, Korean immigrants fit the description of Castells's 
(1975) "ideal worker-consumer"; they are very productive, they con­ 
sume little, and they make few demands on the state. The majority of 
them have been highly educated in their own country and have 
brought with them a strong competitive spirit to this society. Their 
contribution to the U.S. economy will continue to be substantial, 
particularly in filling the cracks in this aging monopoly capitalism.
CONCLUSION
What has been presented above is a somewhat eclectic approach to 
Korean immigration to the United States. Our purpose was not to de­ 
velop any theoretical proposition or to test any hypotheses concern­ 
ing such immigration. Rather, we were interested in identifying the 
major aspects of recent Korean immigration to the United States and 
thereafter examining its structural causes and implications. For this 
latter purpose, we considered the world economic system approach in 
the light of the Korean experience, particularly because there is much 
to be gained by placing international migration within the context of 
the world capitalist system. At the very minimum, many important 
questions are raised by i..iis approach to the analysis of emigration and 
immigration—questions i! - ^ave remained relatively unaddressed; 
these lead us to an examination of some deeper structural factors that 
may influence this process. We acknowledge, however, that larger 
structural reasons do not necessarily subsume individualistic reasons 
for migration. Although the latter may be shaped and constrained by 
the former, each set of factors may produce its own influence on an 
individual's behavior. We believe, therefore, that both the older indi­ 
vidualistic approach and the newer world system approach are useful 
for improving our knowledge of international migration.
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At the individual level, it seems that the most important character­ istic of Korean immigration to this country is the immigrants' strong motivation toward upward social mobility. Voluntary migration any­ where is undoubtedly motivated by the desire to improve one's life; this seems to be particularly the case among Korean immigrants to the United States. And, as noted above, the majority of Koreans migrating to this country are well-educated and have come from high-status oc­ cupations. Most of them are not the victims of peripheral economic development but, rather, likely to be the beneficiaries of this process. They are more likely than nonmigrants to have been part of the mod­ ernized sector of the Korean society. When asked why they came to the United States, the majority offered reasons related to social mo­ bility (e.g., better economic opportunities for themselves, or better education for their children).
Of course, not all who possess the same aspirations can expect to migrate to the United States. Recent Korean immigrants, like immi­ grants from other countries, are more likely than earlier immigrants to have had relatives already in the United States. That is, social net­ works between the two countries operate as the most important chan­ nel, as well as a facilitating factor, for Korean immigration to the United States. It will be interesting to see how this changing pattern of immigration will affect the ways in which Korean immigrants adapt to American society.
Why many Koreans seek to improve their lot in the United States seems at first glance to require a simple answer. The United States is a much richer country than the Republic of Korea; Korea also possesses more limited material resources and a high population density even in rural areas. This answer, however, is too simple. For international mi­ gration is caused not simply by comparison of the living standard in one's own society with that in another but also by the articulation of the two economic and social structures. Labor migration is not likely to occur between two societies that are not connected in some way within the larger economic system, no matter how much economic disparity may exist between them. Moreover, poorer economic condi­ tions in the sending country are likely to be systematically related to better conditions in the receiving country. In some cases, people's aspirations that cannot be satisfied in their own society are direct con­ sequences of some powerful foreign influences. For such reasons as these, it becomes important to examine international migration from the world system perspective.
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Since World War II, the Republic of Korea has been deeply inte­ grated into the world capitalist system dominated by the United States. What characterizes the "special friendship" between Korea and the United States, howevr- is not so much economic in nature as it is political and military. Ine Republic of Korea has acted as a frontier of the U.S. world political system's efforts to block Soviet and Chinese expansion in the Far East It was the competition of the big powers that divided Korea into two parts, brought about a tragic war in 1950, and produced military confrontations and authoritarian regimes in both Koreas. The political and economic development of the Republic of Korea must, therefore, be understood in the larger framework of the world politico-military system which involves both capitalist and communist societies rather than just within the capitalist world system. Political conditions in the Republic of Korea (e.g., the threat of an­ other war, authoritarian rule, political instability) must be regarded as an important underlying cause of emigration. On the part of the United States, too, political and diplomatic considerations may as­ sume priority over the economic one (i.e., the need for cheap labor) in the acceptance of thousands of Koreans each year.
In the U.S. economy, Korean immigrants do provide cheaper labor. But what seems to characterize their economic activities is not so much how they are exploited but the way in which they try to evade such exploitation through small independent entrepreneurship. They seem to use this method because of their strong mobility orientations and, probably more importantly, because they have come from a coun­ try where, as in the United States, aggressive commercial capitalism and the value of education have a long history.
It seems that the role of immigrant labor in the advanced economy varies according to the stage and character of the sending economy. The immigrant labor originating from the peripheral economy may be more likely to fill the most arduous and menial positions, whereas the immigrant labor coming from the semi-peripheral economy may be more apt to fill the gaps in the middle rungs of the economic struc­ ture in the recieving society. Or, perhaps, it is not just the economic character of the sending country that shapes the pattern of the immi­ grants' role in the receiving economy; an equally important influence may derive from certain cultural traditions that they bring with them. In order to be more useful, the world economic system theory must pay closer attention to the historical and cultural context of each
28 Korean Immigration to the United States
sending economy as well as the unique political situation of each 
country from which the receiving country accepts its immigrant labor
force.
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